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Truth or Consequences: Why the Rejection of
the Pretext Plus Approach to Employment
Discrimination Cases in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Establishes the Better Legal Rule
MARCIA L. MCCORMICK*

INTRODUCTION

Employment discrimination lawsuits are unique in the menagerie of civil
actions. This is true, in part, because discrimination in our society is insidious
and often subtle to the observer. Applying the rigid structure of the law, with
its preference for bright lines and certainty, to the uncertain problem of
societal discrimination, is difficult. It requires judges to determine the
motivation of individuals who are sometimes similar in background to the
judges themselves.' Moreover, employment discrimination lawsuits arise in a
context where adverse employment actions are presumptively valid.2 There
is a constant tension in employment discrimination law between the
recognition that discrimination can be subtle without having direct evidence
of its existence3 and the recognition that under the law, hard evidence is
necessary to prove an ultimate fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
It was this tension that prompted the Supreme Court to devise a method
of proof for employment discrimination cases that differs from the usual civil
* J.D., Iowa Law School, 1993; B.A., Grinnell College. 1989. Marcia L. McCormick
is an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Illinois. The views expressed in this article are
solely hers and do not reflect the view of the Attorney General's Office or its client agencies.
I wish to thank John O'Connell and Patrick Carlson for editing drafts of this article.
1. To the extent thatjudges identify with someone accused of discrimination, they will
reflexively give that person the benefit ofevery doubt. Although many people harbor deep seated
racist and sexist feelings, most do not acknowledge those feelings and instead sublimate them into
something more acceptable. See, e.g., AMERICANCITIESINTRANSrION:THECHANGINGFACEOF
URBAN INEQUALrrY (Alice O'Connor, Chris Tilly & Lawrence D. Bobo, eds. 2000); CHILDREN
Now, A DIFFERENT WORLD: CHiLDREN'S PERCEPI1ONS OF RACE AND CLASS IN MEDIA (1998).
Accusing someone with whom ajudge identifies, even a little, of discriminating will cause that

judge to become defensive on her or his own behalf, giving the benefit of that defensiveness to the

individual accused.
2. By saying thatadverse employment actions are presumptively valid, I mean that they
are legally valid, since most employment is "at will." "At will" employment allows an employer
legally to discharge any employee for any reason or no reason at all. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
525 (6th ed. 1990); See also MARK A.ROTHSTIEN ET AL., E PLOYMENT LAW I (2d ed. 1999).
3. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes").
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case.' In employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff must first prove a

"prima facie" case of discrimination by proving: 1) that he or she is a member
of a class protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 2) that the
employer took an adverse employment action against him or her; 3) that he or
she was qualified for the job or performing adequately; and 4) that similarly
situated people outside the protected class were treated differently.' The
employer must then provide evidence, although not prove, that its adverse
6
employment action was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
Once the employer has produced this evidence, the plaintiff must prove that
the reason articulated is only a pretext for discrimination.7 The word "pretext"
generally is understood to mean a lie.'
Recent developments in how to analyze the pretext prong of the balancing
test illustrate the difficulty employment discrimination poses to the law. Once
a court has found that an employer lied about its reason for acting, it must then
*determine whether it can draw any inference from the fact that the employer
lied. The solution to the difficulty this question presents is for triers of fact to
look very closely at the facts and the credibility of witnesses in each individual
case. Triers of fact must also approach those facts with the knowledge that our
society is permeated with some level of animosity, both conscious and
subconscious, towards those who differ from the norm.9
In order to fully illustrate this point, this Article will outline the analytical
background of employment discrimination cases. It will then describe the U.S.

4.

Texas Dep'tof Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-53 (1981); McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
5. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell DouglasCorp., 411 U.S. at 802.
6. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell DouglasCorp., 411 U.S. at 802.
7. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell DouglasCorp., 411 U.S. at 802.
8. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d64,68 (7thCir. 1995); see Shagerv. Upjohn Co.,
913 F.2d 398,401 (7thCir. 1990) (Posner, J.); Seealso BLACK'SLAWDICIONARY 602, 1187 (6th
ed. 1990). It seems that few cous have recognized that the term pretext does not necessarily mean
a lie, but that it could also mean a facially neutral reason based on a prohibited assumption, such
as personal animosity when that personal animosity is really sublimated racism or sexism.
CompareStaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561,581-84 (W. Va. 1996) (recognizing that
discrimination is not always conscious) with State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Sexton, 748 So.2d 200,
213-14 (Ala. 1998) (holding that there is no pretext unless there is a lie); see alsoPrice Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing that discrimination is illegal whether the animus is
conscious or has been sublimated into something like stereotyping); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (recognizing the same thing).
9. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]e presume [the
employer's) acts, ifotherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors."); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989)
(recognizing that discrimination is illegal whether the animus is conscious or has been sublimated
into something like stereotyping); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,990 (1988)
(recognizing the same thing).
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Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"0 which was
intended to resolve a dispute in the lower courts over how to analyze the
pretext prong of the balancing test. This Article will then describe the effect
of St. Mary's Honor Centerand the new dispute it created in both federal and
state courts. The weaknesses in one approach adopted under St. Mary's Honor
Center will be highlighted because that approach was used to alter
employment discrimination cases brought in Illinois under the Illinois Human
Rights Act, so that employers had an unfair advantage in employment
discrimination cases." Finally, this Article will demonstrate that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,12
which clarified its decision in St. Mary's Honor Center, should help the
Illinois Courts and others restore the proper balance to employment
discrimination law.
I. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND
In cases with only circumstantial evidence of discrimination and no
"smoking gun," the U.S. Supreme Court designed a method of analysis for the

evidence presented that creates a legal presumption of discrimination when a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. 3 This legal presumption may be
countered by the defendant's articulation 4 of a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for its action. The plaintiff must then show that reason to be a pretext
for discrimination. 5
This test, with its shifting burdens, was designed as a "sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence,"' 6 because "[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness'
testimony as to the employer's mental processes."' 7 The early U.S. Supreme

10. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
11. These cases were Illinois J.Livingston Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 704
N.E.2d 797 (11. App. Ct. 1998) and Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687
N.E.2d 1090 (III. App. Ct. 1997).
12. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
13. Texas Dep'tof Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-53 (1981); see McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As stated above, the prima facie case is
established when a plaintiff shows that: 1) he or she is a member of a protected class; 2) the
employer took an employment action adverse to him or her; 3) heor she was qualified and meeting
the employer's legitimate expectations; and 4) similarly situated people outside the protected class
were treated differently. Burdine,450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
14. The employer's articulation must be in the form of admissible evidence. Burdine,450
U.S. at 255. However, the employer's burden is only one of production. Id. The burden of proof
remains with the plaintiff. Id at 256.
15. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259-60; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 792.
16. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
17. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983).
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Court cases recognized that discrimination was widespread and difficult to
detect."
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, the Supreme Court explained
the function of the prima facie case: "[a] prima facie case ... raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors."' 9 Thus, the prima facie case, by itself, can prove
unlawful discrimination. In fact, if the employer does not provide evidence
that it acted for a legitimate reason, the trier of fact "must' ' enter judgment for
the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. 0

Similarly, if the employer does present evidence of a legitimate reason for
its action, but the trier of fact does not believe that this was the true reason for
the employer's action, it may infer, without more evidence, that unlawful
discrimination was the real reason. This inference is permissible because the
elements of the prima facie case remain sufficient to create that inference, and
because it has chosen to believe the plaintiff' s contention that discrimination
was the true reason.2 ' The fact that the employer lied is itself circumstantial
evidence that discriminatory animus was the employer's true motivation: "[i]f
the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference
that the real reason was a forbidden one... may rationally be drawn." 22
After the Court's decisions in Furnco Construction Corp. and Burdine,
and before St. Mary's Honor Centerwas decided, a split developed within the
federal circuits about the legal effect of the trier's disbelief of the employer's
reason. Some federal courts of appeal had held that when a plaintiff made a
primafaciecase and the trier disbelieved the employer's reason, the fact finder

18. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 ("[The question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases
is both sensitive and difficult."). The Court inAikens recognized that the reason for this difficulty
was that on the one hand courts were presented with an important national policy against

discrimination and the fact that mental processes are almost impossible to prove. Id. On the other
hand, the Court noted, that the strictures of the law required a certain form and quality of proof.
Id.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Fumco, 438 U.S. at 577.
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
Shager v.Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398,401(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); seealsoWallace

v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.); Perdomo v. Browner,
67 F.3d 140, 145 (7th Cir. 1995).
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was required to enter judgment for the plaintiff. 3 This rule was called the

"pretext only" rule 3 '
Other courts held that in that situation, the trier was prohibited from
entering judgment for the plaintiff unless the plaintiff came forward with
specific, explicit evidence of discriminatory animus in addition to the prima
facie case.' This rule was called the "pretext plus" rule. 6
The Court in St. Mary's Honor Center attempted to reconcile these
conflicting lines of authority.'
II. THE DECISION IN ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER

The plaintiff in St. Mary's HonorCenter,Melvin Hicks, was an AfricanAmerican man, hired in 1978 to be a correctional officer at St. Mary's Honor
Center, a minimum security correctional facility in Missouri. 8 Beginning in
1983, the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources began
investigating St. Mary's after receiving complaints about maintenance,
security, and other issues." Due to the investigation's findings, several upperlevel administrators were demoted or terminated and replaced with new
people.30 Steve Long, who was white, became the superintendent of the
facility, and John Powell, who also was white, became the chief of custody and
Hicks' direct supervisor.3'
Before these changes in management, Hicks had received performance
reviews rating him competent, and he had never been disciplined.3 2 After the
change, a series of disciplinary charges were brought against Hicks over the

23. See, e.g., Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991);
MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988); Dister v. Continental Group,
Inc., 859 F.2d 1108,1113 (2dCir. 1988); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 830 F.2d 1554, 1563-64
(11 th Cir. 1987); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893,899 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc); Tye
v. Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 315,318 (6th Cir. 1987); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781,
789 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Lowe v. City ofMonrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 784 F.2d
1407 (1986).
24. Catherine J.Lanctot, The Defendant Lies andthe PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy ofthe
"Pretext-Plus "Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57,65-66 (1991)
[hereinafter Lanctot].
25. See, e.g., Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5thCir. 1988);
Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845,849 (4th Cir. 1988); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037,
1042-43 (1st Cir. 1984).
26. Lanctot, supra note 25, at 66-67.
27. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1993).
28. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
29. Id. at 1246.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id
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course of seven weeks,33 culminating in the discharge of Hicks for
insubordination. Hicks was to be demoted on April 19, 1984. He was notified
that day of his demotion at a meeting with Long, Powell, and the assistant
After the meeting Hicks asked for the
superintendent of the facility.'
35 This request was granted, but Powell followed
off.
remainder of the day
Hicks from the meeting, ordered him to open his locker, and ordered him to
turn over his shift commander manual.' The men argued, and Hicks offered
to "step outside" with Powell. 3" Powell warned Hicks that his words could be
construed as a threat, and Hicks left.38 A disciplinary board met and
recommended a three-day suspension.3 9 Long recommended termination, and
on June 7, 1984, Hicks was terminated. 4' In each of these incidents, other
similarly situated non-African-American employees were treated more
leniently.4 The reason given for Hicks' discharge was the severity and
accumulation of disciplinary violations. 42 After Hicks was discharged, his
3
position remained open, and eventually he was replaced by a white male.
Hicks filed a race discrimination suit in federal court against St. Mary's
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and against Long under 42

33. Id. at 1246-47. On March 3, 1984, Hicks was the shift commander during a shifton
which a number of institutional rules were violated. Id. Hicks was suspended for five days. Id. at
1247.
On March 19,1984, Hicks allowed two correctional officers to use a car, but neither
they nor the control center officer logged the use of the car as required. Id. A disciplinary review
board voted to demote Hicks. Id

On March 21, 1984, before Hicks was demoted, an inmate was injured in a fight with
another inmate. Id Hicks wrote a memo to Powell notifying him of the incident and the injury and
ordered the correctional officer who escorted the injured inmate to the hospital to write a report on
the incident. Id Three days later, Powell told Long that Hicks had failed to investigate the assault,
and five days after that, Powell reprimanded Hicks for failing to investigate. Id
34. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.

40. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1247-48 (E.D. Mo. 1991).

l

41.

For example, in the first two incidents, no other responsible officer was disciplined.

at 1247. Additionally, while Hicks was fired for insubordination, when he had previously

recommended discipline for a subordinate who had cursed him with highly profane language due
to abad review, no disciplinary action was taken. Id. at 1248. Hicks also reported at least six rule
violations committed by white correctional officers, none of whom were disciplined. Id. Finally,
Hicks reported that a white officer whose negligence allowed an inmate to escape was given only
a letter of reprimand. Id
42. Id. at 1247.
43. Id. at 1250.
44.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
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U.S.C. §1983. 45 After a bench trial, the district court found that Hicks had
made a prima facie case of race discrimination and that St. Mary's and Long
had offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their action." The
district court also found that Hicks had proven that the reason offered by St.
Mary's was a lie, but that he failed to prove that the real reason for the action
was his race rather than personal animosity.'
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, ordered it to
enter judgment for Hicks and to make a finding on damages." The appellate
court found that once Hicks had discredited the employers' proffered reasons,
"defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for their
actions. In other words, defendants were in no better position than if they
remained silent."' 9 Accordingly, the appellate court found that Hicks was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and
reversed the Eighth Circuit, remanding the matter for further proceedings."'
In making its decision, the Court rejected both the pretext plus and pretext
only lines of authority, opting for a middle ground that allows judgment for a
plaintiff without evidence of discriminatory animus beyond the prima facie
case, but does not require that judgment be entered for the plaintiff under those
circumstances. 2 This middle-ground approach, which could be termed the
"pretext sufficient" rule, had been established by the Seventh Circuit. 3
The Court held that the pretext only rule violated its holding in Burdine
that the defendant need only produce admissible evidence of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason; it "need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons."54 The Court emphasized that in order to
fid for a plaintiff, a trier of fact needed to find not only that the employer's

45. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
46. Id. at 1249-50.
47. Id. at 1250-52. The court did not believe that personal animosity masked
discriminatory animus because some of Hicks' coworkers who had not been disciplined for
violations were African American. See idat 1251-52.
48. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 488,493 (8th Cir. 1992).
49. Id. at 492. The analysis of the Eighth Circuit focused on the evidence before the
district court. Id. The appellate court rejected the district court's conclusion about personal

motivations on the grounds that there was no evidence to support that assumption. Id

50. Id. at 493.
51. St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 505, 525 (1993).
52. Id at511.
53. Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc);
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398,401 (7th Cir. 1990).
54. St. Mary's Honor Cr., 509 U.S. at 510 (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
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proffered reason was a lie, but also that the true reason was discrimination. 5
Grounding the Court's analysis was the recognition that it would violate the
fundamental legal principle that plaintiffs have the burden of proof in a cause
of action to compel a finding of an intent to discriminate once the lesser
standard of disbelief of the proffered reason was met.56
Although the Court rejected the pretext only rule and the reasoning
behind it, the Court struggled to maintain the balance as it existed before the
split in the circuits, implicitly rejecting the pretext plus rule as well. As the
Court in St. Mary's Honor Centerexplained:

The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the proffered reasons, will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when
'[n]o additional proof of
it noted that, upon such rejection,
57
required.'
is
discrimination
Thus, the decision in St. Mary's Honor Center was an attempt to fix an
imbalance created by the pretext only rule, but it also was an attempt to
maintain the balance between the usual lack of direct evidence of
discrimination and the preference in the law for direct evidence. 8 To that end,
the Court adopted the pretext sufficient rule.59 However, it discussed at length
the problems with the pretext only rule, which many lower courts focused on,
to the exclusion of the pretext sufficient language.

55. l at515.
56. ILat 514-15
57. 509 U.S. at 511 (footnote and citation omitted, emphasis in original).
58. The dissent in St. Mary's Honor Centerdisagreed that a balance was struck. The
dissent suggested that the majority's decision changed the law set forth by Burdine, and required
a plaintiff to refute not only the evidence presented by the employer, but also any reason not
articulated by the employer but discerned in the record by the factfinder. 509 U.S. at 532-38
(Souter, J., dissenting). This did not give the plaintiff a"'full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext' as required by Burdine. Id.at 531-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 258 and omitting internal quotations). Essentially, the dissent contended, the majority's
approach amounted to the pretext plus approach. See idat 535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id at 511.
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M. THE SPLIT REMAINS AFTER THE DECISION IN ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER
IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

After the decision in St. Mary's Honor Center, a split remained among
the circuits, but the issue became more finely tuned. Before the decision in St.
Mary's Honor Centerthe two views were: 1) that a lie by the employer mandated judgment for the plaintiff; or 2) that a lie by the employer was irrelevant
without additional direct proof of class-based animus. After the decision in St.
Mary's Honor Center the point of divergence was whether any inference of
discrimination could arise from the fact of the employer's lie itself.
Three circuits have held that no inference could be drawn from the fact
that the employer lied. ° Eight circuits have held that a fact finder may infer
6
discrimination from the fact that the employer lied. The Eighth Circuit,
walking a thin line between the two positions, has held that discrimination can
2
be inferred from the fact of a lie only when the lie is obvious.'
Positions taken by states on their own anti-discrimination laws are less
easy to characterize. Half of the states and the District of Columbia either
3
have not considered the issue or do not use the federal analysis.' Of those that
have considered the issue, supreme and appellate courts of most states
have adopted the pretext sufficient rle for their state anti-discrimina7
5
tion laws. They include: California," Colorado, Indiana," Louisiana,'
60. Thomas v.Eastman KodakCo., 183 F.3d 38,56-57,64-65(1st Cir. 1999); Gillins v.

Berkely Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d413, 416-17 (4th Cir. 1998); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d
1332, 1344-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
61. Sheehanv. DonlenCorp., 173 F.3d 1039,1045-46 (7thCir. 1999); Akav. Washington
Hosp. Center, 156F.3d 1284,1289-94 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d
337,346-47 (6th Cir. 1997); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519,1529 (1 th Cir. 1997);
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061,1066-67,1070-71 (3dCir. 1996) (en
banc); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989,994-95 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Randle v.
City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451-53 (10thCir. 1995); Washington v. Garret, 10F.3d 1421, 1433
(9th Cir. 1993).
62. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328,1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996). The
court did not give an example of a lie it would consider obvious. Id
63. These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, and Virginia.
64. Begnal v. Canfield& Assoc., 78 Cal. App. 4th 66,77 (1st Dist. 2000) (finding that the
trier offact can infer the ultimate fact ofdiscrimination if the plaintiff discredits the stated reasons
for termination); Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597,614 (6th Dist. 1999) (upholding
a jury verdict in case where plaintiff discredited the proffered reason).
65. Bodaghi v. DNR, 995 P.2d 288, 291, 302 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
66. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Southern IndianaGas & Elec. Co., 648 N.E.2d 674,
683, 685, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
67. Guillory v. State Farm Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 104,114-15 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that the fact of the lie carries some weight).
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Minnesota," Missouri, 69 Montana, 70 New Jersey, 71 New York,7 2 North
Dakota, 73 Rhode Island,74 Tennessee," West Virginia, 76 and Wyoming.
Massachusetts has gone one step further, rejecting St. Mary's Honor Center
entirely and proclaiming itself a pretext only jurisdiction.'
Conversely, six states have adopted the view that no inference can be
made from the fact that the employer lied. They include: Illinois," Michigan,'
Mississippi,8 ' Nebraska, 2 Ohio,83 and Washington." Courts in Alabama, 5

68. Hoover v.Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 605 N.W.2d 757, 765 (Minn. Ct App.
2000) (holding that pretext can be proven directly with evidence of improper motive or indirectly
by discrediting proffered reason).
69. Conway v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 7 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999).
70. Heiat v. Eastern Montana Coll., 912 P.2d 787, 792 (Mont. 1996).
71. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 955 (NJ 1999).
72. Ferrante v. American Lung Ass'n, 687 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (N.Y. 1997).
73. Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 379 (N.D. 1995).
74. Center for Behavioral Health v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 685-86 (R.I. 1998).
75. Smith v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 197, 202-03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
76. Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561, 583 (W.Va. 1996) (holding that the
employer's failure to present acredible nondiscriminatory reason leaves the fact of adiscriminatory
reason a logical inference).
77. Bachmeierv. Hoffman, I P.3d 1236,1244(Wyo. 2000) (holding that pretext can be
proven directly with evidence of a bad motive or indirectly by discrediting the reason).
78. Blare v Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 111, 115-17 (Mass.
1995).
79. Illinois J.
Livingston Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 704N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1998); Christ Hosp. &Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill.
App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1997).
80. Lytle v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1998) (holding that the trier cannot infer
anything from the fact of an employer's lie). Butsee Town v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 568 N.W.2d
64 (Mich. 1997) (holding that whether anything can be inferred from the fact of an employer's lie
is a fact-intensive question).
81. Columbus Paper& Chem., Inc. v. Chamberlin, 687 So.2d 1143,1152 (Miss. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff must prove that the employer lied and that the prohibited factor actually
motivated the employer with evidence that the prohibited factor played a part in the decision).
82. Synacek v. OmahaCold Storage Terminals, 247 Neb. 244,252-53 (1995), overruled
in part on other grounds by Billingsley v. BFM Liquor Mgmt., 259 Neb. 992 (2000). But see
Ventura v. State Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 246 Neb. 116, 126-27, 129 (1994)
(stating that disbelief of proffered reason can allow an inference of pretext).
83. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Kent St. Univ., 717 N.E.2d 745,756,760 (Ohio Ct.
App. 11th Dist. 1998). But see Atkinson v. Int'l Tech., Inc., 666 N.E.2d 257,264-66 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1st Dist. 1995) (indicating that disbelief is sufficient for the court to infer pretext).
84. Hill v. PCTI Income Fund-I, 986 P.2d 137, 142-43 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999).
85. State Dep'tof Pub. Safety v. Sexton, 748 So. 2d 200, 207 (Ala. 1998) (stating that the
plaintiff must prove that the reason is a lie and that the real reason is discrimination, but not
applying the language to the case).
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Iowa, 6 Texas," and Wisconsings are less clear about what inference can be
made from a lie. They each suggest that the inquiry depends upon what the lie
is and whether it is patently incredible, much like the Eight Circuit's
standard. 9
Thus, the majority of jurisdictions recognize that some negative inference
may be drawn from the fact that the employer lied about the reason for the
adverse employment action. This is a better approach to the problem of
employment discrimination for several reasons. It acknowledges both that
discrimination exists in our society, and that it is subtle. Additionally, this
approach ensures that any employer who lies about the reason for the adverse
action does so at certain risk.
Prohibiting adverse inferences from the fact of a lie is a poor approach to
the problem of employment discrimination. It invites a reviewing court to
substitute its judgment for the trier of fact in every case in which the trier has
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but not when the employer has prevailed. This
approach also requires that a plaintiff disprove every possible, but unstated,
nondiscriminatory reason an employer might have had for the adverse
employment action. Finally, for all practical purposes, it requires that plaintiffs
have direct evidence of discrimination despite repeated holdings by the
Supreme Court that direct evidence is not necessary.
IV. ILLINOIS -CASES ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEMS INHERENT INTHE POSTST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER PRETEXT PLUS APPROACH

Some background on the Illinois anti-discrimination laws will be helpful
to understand the impact of St. Mary's Honor Center on Illinois law. The
Illinois Constitution prohibits discrimination." To implement this provision,

86. Bd. of Supervisors of Buchanan County v. IowaCivil Rights Comm'n, 584 N.W.2d
252,256 (Iowa 1998) (stating that a trier may infer pretext from the fact of the lie, but only if there

is "an affirmative finding.., that the inference is sufficient").

87. Thomas v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 734,739 (Tex. App. 14th Dist.
1999) (holding that a plaintiff can prove pretext indirectly by showing that the proffered reason is
not true); see also Jaso v.Travis County Juvenile Bd., 6 S.W.3d 324,330 (Tex. App. 3d Dist. 1999)

(holding that a plaintiff must prove both the lie and that the prohibited factor played a role, but that
the evidence may strongly indicate that the employer has introduced fabricated justification for an
employee's discharge, and not otherwise suggest acredible nondiscriminatory explanation, which
would allow an inference of discrimination from the lie).
88. Kovalic v.DEC Int'l, 519 N.W.2d 351,353-54(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting that
a negative inference may be taken from the lie itself, but only when that lie it obvious).
89.
90.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Ill. Const. Art. I, §17.
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In interpreting the

Illinois Human Rights Act, the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the indirect
method of proof created by McDonnell Douglasand Burdine.' While Illinois
courts are not required to apply federal cases interpreting federal law to cases
under state law, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the purpose of the
Illinois Human Rights Act was furthered by the analytical approach developed
in those federal cases. 93
Soon after the decision in St. Mary's Honor Center, Illinois appellate
courts were asked to apply it to decisions brought under the Illinois Human
Rights Act.9 The appellate court decided to do so. The court in two of the
cases adopted the pretext sufficient view. In Southern Illinois Clinicv. Human
Rights Comm'n,9' the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth Judicial District
held that the trier of fact could infer intentional discrimination from the
plaintiff's prima facie case and its disbelief of the employer's proffered reason
for its actions." The facts which made up the prima facie case proved
discrimination once the employer's reason was disbelieved. 79 Likewise, in
Cisco Trucking Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n,9s the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Fourth Judicial District found that the Commission's disbelief of the

91. Baker v. Miller, 636 N.E.2d 551,553 (ill. 1994). The Illinois Human Rights Act is
codified at 775 ILCS 5/1-101 through 10-103. 775 ILL. COrWa'. STAT. 5/1-101 to 10-103 (West
1998). Under the act, a person aggrieved files a charge with the Illinois Department of Human
Rights, an investigatory agency which determines whether there is substantial evidence of
discrimination to warrant filing a complaint with the Illinois Human Rights Commission, the
adjudicatory agency. 775 ILL.COM. STAT. 5/7A-102 (West 1998). Once acomplaint is filed with

the Commission, the Commission appoints an administrative law judge to hold a hearing. That
ALl makes arecommendation to the Commissionon liability and, if warranted, damages. 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8A- 102 (West 1998). The Commission reviews the recommendation and will adopt
it unless the facts are against the manifest weight ofthe evidence or the decision is contrary to law.
775 IL. COM. STAT. 5/8A- 103 (West 1998). The party which did not prevail can then seek review
of the Commission's decision directly in the appellate court. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-111 (A)(1)
(West 1998). The appellate court reviews the Commission's decision and may not reverse it unless
the factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, or the decision is contrary to
law. 775 ILL. COWP. STAT. 5/3-110 (West 1998); Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human
Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136, 1140-41 (Il. 1996); see also Habinka v. Human Rights
Comm'n, 548 N.E.2d702, 719 (M. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (noting that the reviewing court applies
the standard to the Commission's decision not the recommendation of the ALJ).
92. Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 (11. 1989).
93. Id at 178-79.
94. See Southern Illinois Clinic v. Human Rights Comm'n, 654 N.E.2d 655, 661-62 (Ill.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995); Cisco Trucking Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 653 N.E.2d 986, 989-90
(Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
95. 654 N.E.2d 655 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995).
96. Southern Illinois Clinic, 654 N.E.2d at 661.
97. Id.
98. 653 N.E.2d 986 (II. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
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employer's proffered reason for its action, considered in conjunction with the
record as a whole, supported its decision that the employer's reason was a
pretext for discrimination."
Despite these prior cases by other divisions of the appellate court, in
1997'00 and 1998,'01 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First Judicial District
interpreted St. Mary's Honor Center to require the pretext plus rule, holding
that in addition to the prima facie case and proof that the employer is lying,
complainants must offer additional proof of discrimination."0 2 A description
of these two cases will help illustrate the problems inherent in the pretext plus
approach.
A. CHRIST HOSPITAL & MEDICAL CENTER V. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

The complainant in Christ Hospital & Medical Center was an AfricanAmerican man named Charles Hughes. 0 3 He had been hired by the hospital
as a third-shift housekeeping supervisor in 1980.'" In December of 1982,
Hughes was promoted to housekeeping operations manager, which required
him to travel between three facilities to supervise housekeeping employees.0
In late 1983, the hospital began an investigation into alleged irregularities in
the housekeeping department.' 6 Hughes' supervisor resigned, but there was
insufficient evidence to warrant any disciplinary action against Hughes. 0"
In December 1983, Charles Jones, Hughes' new supervisor, gave Hughes
a poor performance evaluation.' 08 On review, that evaluation was changed to
reflect that Hughes was performing his job competently.'0 9 A month later,

99. Cisco Trucking, 653 N.E.2d at 989-90.
100. Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090 (111. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1997).
101. Ilinois J.Livingston Co. v. nlinois Human Rights Comm'n, 704 N.E.2d 797 (111. App.

Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
102. Illinois J. Livingston Co., 704 N.E.2d at 807; Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 687 N.E.2d
at 1093.
103. Christ Hosp. & Med Ctr., 687 N.E.2d at 1090-91.

104.

Id.

105. Id at 1091.
106. Id.
107. Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090,1091-92 (l.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997). Hughes was required to pay $500 in restitution for travel costs to
reimburse mileage actually traveled but in excess of the set number of miles for which the policy
allowed reimbursement. Id. at 1091-92. Hughes had traveled more miles between facilities than
the hospital's policy allowed at the direction of his supervisor, who gave Hughes driving
instructions to avoid construction areas between facilities. Id.
108. Id. at 1091-92.
109. Id.
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Jones recommended that Hughes be terminated based on his failure to follow
the travel policy."' The hospital's associate administrator and human
resources director notified Jones that Hughes could not be terminated under
the hospital's disciplinary policy since he had not been subject to prior
discipline."'
In the first half of 1984, the hospital reorganized the housekeeping
department, eliminating the operations manager positions and creating a new
position called quality control officer." 2 Hughes was demoted to third-shift
supervisor.'"
Hughes applied for the quality control officer position, which was
substantially similar to the housekeeping operations manager position."4
Although he was qualified and was the only applicant, Hughes was denied the
position, which remained open." 5 After four months, the employer withdrew
the position." 6
Hughes filed a charge of race discrimination with the Illinois Department
of Human Rights which filed a complaint with the Human Rights
Commission."' The Commission held a hearing, and found that the hospital
had refused to promote Hughes based on his race."' The Commission found
that Hughes had made a prima facie case of discrimination because he
established that he was African-American, qualified for the promotion, was
rejected for the promotion, and the position remained open." 9 The employer
offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action claiming that
Hughes was not qualified for the promotion' ° and that he was the subject of
an investigation.' 2' Hughes presented evidence in the form of admissions by

110. Id.
111. Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090,1091-92 (I1.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
112. Id
113. Id. Theother housekeeping operations manager, a white man who had been suspended
during the investigation, resigned before he could be demoted. Id at 1091-92.
114. Id. at 1091-92.
115. 1d
116. Id at 1092.
117. Christ Hosp. & Med. Cu'. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090 (1st Dist.

1997).
118. Id. at 1091.
119.

InreHughesandChristHosp.,ChargeNo. 1984CF2073,1996ILHUMLEXIS 1074,

at* 11- 12 (111. Hum. Rights Comm'n, June 28,1996); In re Hughes and Christ Hosp., Charge No.
1984CF2073,1991 ILHUM LEXIS 45, at *14-15 (fi1. Hum. Rights Comm'n AU Rec. Liabil. Det.,

Nov. 8, 1991); see Christ Hosp. & Med Center, 687 N.E.2d at 1093.
120. This could have been viewed either as an attack on the elements of the prima facie
case or a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
121. Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 687 N.E.2d at 1093.
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the decision makers that they actually knew that he was qualified and that they
Accordingly, the
had no idea whether the investigation continued.'2
Commission found that the reasons were a pretext for discrimination', and that

the record as a whole supported an inference of discrimination."

The hospital appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded the
matter back to the Commission. " The appellate court found that based on the
conflicting evidence and the admissions of the hospital's witnesses, the
Commission could disbelieve the hospital's proffered reasons for not
promoting Hughes." s The appellate court found that under St. Mary's Honor
Center, however, the Commission could not infer that discrimination was the
real reason for the hospital's action without further findings of fact." The
appellate court further found that there was no evidence that allowed an
inference of discrimination to be made. 2 Rather than just reverse, however,
the appellate court found that there was one possible piece of evidence that
would allow an inference of discrimination: a few months after the quality
control officer position was dissolved, the hospital created a quality control
training coordinator position with nearly the same job description, which
Hughes alleged was not posted, and which was awarded to a less-qualified
white woman.'" The Commission had made no factual findings on these
points, so the court remanded for the Commission to resolve the issue." 9
The appellate court in Christ Hospital & Medical Center essentially
found that no inference of discrimination could be drawn from the proof of the
prima facie case and the fact that the employer lied. Additional proof was
required. The employee was required to show that it was race and not "some
122. Id at 1091-93.
123. In re Hughes and Christ Hosp., Charge No. 1984CF2073,1996 ILHUM LEXIS 1074,
at *20-21 (111. Hum. Rights Comm'n, June 28,1996); In re Hughes and Christ Hosp., Charge No.
1984CF2073,1991 ILHUM LEXIS 45, at* 15-16 (111. Hum Rights Comm'n AUI Rec. Liabil. Det.,
Nov. 8, 1991). But see Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 687 N.E.2d at 1093-94 (finding that the
Commission merely rejected the reasons offered by the hospital and did not make a finding that
discrimination was the real reason for the hospital's action).
124. Christ Hosp.&Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090,1095 (111. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
125. Id at 1093-94.
126. Id at 1094.
127. Ignoring the elements of the prima facie case, the fact that Hughes was the only
African-American supervisor, that the hospital diverted from its policy in order to not promote him,

that his supervisor's negative feelings were out of proportion to any "offense" by Hughes, and that

though he was the only qualified applicant, the Hospital dissolved the position rather than give it
to a qualified African-American man, the appellate court found that no inference of discrimination
could be drawn from any of the circumstantial evidence. id.
128. Id.
129. ChristHosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 1090,1094-95(I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
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other legitimate, though not necessarily commendable, motive."' 3 ° In other
words, without some racially-charged comment or evidence of a suitable non-

African-American comparator,13' the employee had to disprove every other
conceivable motivation by the hospital. This analysis, the court felt,
"necessarily follows from the premise that the employee retains the burden of
persuasion throughout the case."' 32
B. ILLINOIS J. LIVINGSTON CO. V. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

A year after the decision in ChristHospital& Medical Center, a different
division of the First Judicial District considered the issue in the context of an
age discrimination case. The complainant in Illinois J. Livingston Co. v.
Human Rights Commission... was a sixty-one year old man who began

working as an electrician in the Prudential building' in 1949. ' In 1984, new

management took over that building.' 36 After new management took over,
Gisch was required to fill out more paperwork than other electricians, and he
was the only electrician required to get his supplies from a locked cabinet to
which he lacked the key.'37 The new management ultimately terminated Gisch

in 1989.' a
Gisch filed a charge with the Department of Human Rights, which filed
a complaint with the Human Rights Commission, alleging that Gisch was
terminated because of his age.'39 At the hearing, several people testified that

130. Id. at 1093.
131. Thus, any employee who was the only applicant for a position, was qualified, was
denied the position, and then whose employer terminated the position for which the employee
applied could never prove that the decision was motivated by an impermissible factor without
direct evidence because there would never be a comparator.
132. ChristHosp. & Med. Ctr., 687 N.E.2d at 1093. This conclusion ignores that the fact
finder was actually persuaded by Hughes' evidence. Thus, the court transformed the ultimate issue
from one of fact into an issue of law, declaring what facts were necessary in order to prove the
ultimate fact.
133. 704 N.E.2d 797 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
134. There were two different employers over the years. Illinois J. Livingston Co.. 704
N.E.2d at 799.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 799, 802, 803.
138. Illinois J. Livingston v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n,704 N.E.2d 797,799 (Il.
App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1998).
139. Id
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Gisch was performing his job adequately.'40 Witnesses called by the employer
testified equivocally that Gisch was not performing his work in a timely
manner. 4 ' One witness also testified that the amount of work in the building
had decreased.'
After Gisch left, he was replaced by a man substantially
younger.'43
The Commission found that Gisch had made a prima facie case in that he
was within the protected class, he had been performing his work adequately,
he was terminated, and his employer sought a replacement for him.' 44 The
reason given by the employer for Gisch's termination was that he worked too
4
slowly.

The Commission found that this reason was a pretext for age
discrimination for several reasons. First, it determined that the witnesses who
testified about Gisch's speed were not credible, in part due to the equivocal
nature of their testimony.'" Additionally, there were no records to support

140. fi at 799-804. The appellate court summarized all ofthe testimony presented at the

hearing before the AL, but curiously gave that testimony different weight than either the AJ or

the Commission. For example, the court wrote that Barbara DeLeon, one of the tenants, testified

very specifically about problems she had with Gisch's work. Id. at 801-02. The AL and the
Commission characterized her testimony as much more vague regarding when Gisch had worked
for her, what he had done, what problems existed, and whether she complained about them. In re
Gisch and Illinois J. Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA 1407,1997 ILHUM LEXIS 306, at *3-4 (M.
Human Rights Comm'n, June 12, 1997); In re Gisch and Illinois J.Livingston, Charge No.
1990CA 1407, 1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334, at *7-8 (111. Human Rights Comm'n AU Rec. Liabil.
Det., July 23, 1992). The appellate court did not reverse these findings as against the manifest
weight of the evidence; rather it ignored the Commission's findings about the tenor of the
testimony. See Illinois J.Livingston Co., 704 N.E.2d at 805.
141. llhinoisJ.Livingston Co., 704 N.E.2d at 799-804. In 1987, the lock was changedon
the storage locker in the basement where materials used for tenant work were stored, and Gisch was
not given a key, so he had to spend time to find the foreman with the key to retrieve materials from
it. I at 799.
142. Illinois J. Livingston v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 704 N.E.2d 797,802 (Il1.
App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1998).
143. Gisch's replacement was in his early 40s. In re Gisch and Illinois J. Livingston,
Charge No. 1990CA1407,1997 ILHUM LEXIS 306, at *5 (111. Human Rights Comm'n, June 12,
1997); In reGisch and llinois J. Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA1407,1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334,
at * 14 (Ill. Human Rights Comm'n ALJ Rec. Liabil. Det., July 23, 1992). The appellate court's
opinion does not mention this fact.
144. lnreGisch andllinoisJ. Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA1407,1997 ILHUM LEXIS
306, at *910 (IU.
Human Rights Comm'n, June 12,1997); In re Gisch and Illinois J. Livingston,
Charge No. 1990CA1407, 1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334, at *17 (M. Human Rights Comm'n AL Rec.
Liabil. Det., July 23, 1992).
145. Illinois J. Livingston Co., 704 N.E.2d at 805.
146. Id.; InreGischandillinoisJ. Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA1407, 1997 ILHUM
LEXIS 306, at * 17-18 (I1. Human Rights Comm'n, June 12, 1997); In re Gisch and Illinois J.
Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA1407, 1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334, at *23 (III. Human Rights
Comm'n AL Rec. Liabil. Det., July 23, 1992).
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these complaints, and three of the employer's witnesses remained employed
147
by Illinois J. Livingston and were paid for the time they testified.
Conversely, the three witnesses who testified that Gisch worked in a timely
manner were unbiased and gave detailed testimony, which made them more
credible. 48 Finally, at the hearing, the employer offered a shifting reason for
the termination. 49 The chief engineer suggested that Gisch was terminated
because the work load had decreased by half.'"' Based on the facts that the
employer was not truthful, that it offered shifting reasons for its actions, that
Gisch was doing a good job, and that he was replaced by a much younger man,
the Commission found that Illinois J. Livingston discriminated against Gisch
because of his age."'
The appellate court reversed the Commission's decision. Following the
decision in ChristHospital & Medical Center, the appellate court found that
the Commission failed to make any factual findings that pointed to a
discriminatory intent.'i 2 Ignoring the evidence that Gisch was replaced by
someone substantially younger, the court parsed the remaining evidence,
stating that nothing standing alone pointed to a discriminatory motive. 3
Accordingly, the court found that the ultimate conclusion that discrimination
was the real reason for the employer's action, was against the manifest weight
of the evidence, and reversed.I14
Like the appellate court in ChristHospital & Medical Center, the court
in Illinois J. Livingston Co. found that a complainant needed more than the
evidence which established the prima facie case and more than proof that the
147.

In re Gisch and Illinois J.Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA 1407,1997 ILHUM LEXIS

306, at * 18 (Ill. Human Rights Comm'n, June 12, 1997); Inre Gisch and Illinois J.Livingston,
Charge No. 1990CA 1407,1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334, at *23 (111. Human Rights Comm'n ALJRec.

Liabil. Det., July 23, 1992).
148. Inre Gisch and IllinoisJ. Livingston, Charge No. 1990CA1407, 1997 ILHUM LEXIS
306, at * 18 (111. Human Rights Comm'n, June 12, 1997); In re Gisch and Illinois J.Livingston,
Human Rights Comm'n A.J
Charge No. 1990CA1407, 1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334, at '21-23 (M11.
Rec. Liabil. Det., July 23, 1992).
149. The fact that an employer offers shifting reasons for its employment action raises an
inference of discrimination. Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, 195 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1999).
150. Illinois J.Livingston v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 704 N.E.2d 797,802 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
151. InreGischandillinoisi. Livingston, ChargeNo. 1990CA1407,1997 ILHUM LEXIS
306, at * 18-19 (111. Human Rights Comm'n, June 12,1997); InreGisch and IllinoisJ. Livingston,
Charge No. 1990CA 1407,1992 ILHUM LEXIS 334, at *21-24 (Ill. Human Rights Comm'n AJ
Rec. Liabil. Det., July 23, 1992).
152. IllinoisJ. Livingston Co., 704 N.E.2d at 808.
153. Id at 806-08. Curiously, the court found that the ALJ could disbelieve the employer's
reason for its action but that the only possible inference from the facts was that the employer
discharged Gisch for the reason it suggested. Id. at 807.
154. Id at 808.
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employer was lying.' However, the court in Illinois J. Livingston Co. went
one step further by ignoring the evidence that Gisch was the only employee
required to get supplies from a locked cabinet for which he had no key, that he
was the only electrician required to fill out certain paperwork, and that he was
replaced by a much younger man. The appellate court also ignored the rule of
law that when an employer offers shifting reasons for its employment action,
the trier of fact is entitled to infer discriminatory motive. Thus, the result of
Illinois J. Livingston is that a complainant must have proof of specific
widespread class-based animus or direct evidence that the adverse action was
motivated by age.
I
V. BoTH DECISIONS SHOW THAT THE PRETEXT PLUS STANDARD WEIGHS
THE BALANCE TOO HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF EMPLOYERS

The appellate court's decisions in these two cases fundamentally altered
the nature of Human Rights Act cases, making it nearly impossible to prove
discrimination by the indirect method previously adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court. The hurdle added by the appellate court defeated the
remedial purpose of the Human Rights Act and negated the careful balance
struck by McDonnell Douglas,Burdine, and St. Mary'sHonor Centerbetween
the complainant's burden and his access to information about the employer's
state of mind. It required the complainant to disprove every conceivable
reason for the employer's actions regardless of the reasons the employer put
forth, thus effectively removing the requirement that the employer come
forward with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions.'" The
employer benefits from its lie.
The appellate court's decisions in these two cases are somewhat different
from many of the federal cases after St. Mary's Honor Center because they
reversed a decision by a fact finder after a hearing. They thus show more
vividly the difficulty presented by employment discrimination cases in general.
While both courts admitted that each prong of the balancing test along with the
ultimate issue were factual questions, which should be afforded great

155.
156.

Id.
In fact, one reason the St. Mary's Honor Centerdecision rejected the pretext only rule

was because that rule made the employer's presentation ofevidence meaningless and thus shifted

the burden of proof to the employer. St. Mary's Honor Cr., 509 U.S. at 517-18, 521-23. The

pretext plus rule also makes the employer's presentation of evidence meaningless, however, and
increases the burden of proof for the complainant from a preponderance of the evidence to clear
and convincing. The complainant is required under this rule to disprove every conceivable reason
for the adverse employment action, whether articulated or not, to show with specific proof that the
only probable explanation for the employer's actions was an impermissible factor. Id
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deference,15 both courts found that as a matter of law certain inferences could
not be drawn from those facts. Questions of law are not afforded as much
deference.15 Thus, the appellate court legitimized removing the power to
make factual judgments from the trier of fact in employment discrimination
59
cases.1

Part of the motivation for this analytical shift is the appellate court's

concern over government interference with the employment relationship in the
private sector. The appellate court in Illinois J. Livingston Co. stated that
allowing an inference under these conditions would give employees too much
power over the employment relationship." ° This concern, though pervasive,
is unfounded. It is true that under the pretext sufficient rule an employer runs
the risk that it will be held liable for discrimination if the trier does not believe
its proffered reasons, but that is the risk typical in any kind of litigation where
the parties have two differing versions of events. A defendant always runs the
risk that it will not be believed. Because it is more likely that a person will be
believed if he tells the truth, the prospect of disbelief carrying a penalty creates
an incentive to tell the truth. Under the appellate court's holdings, employers
have no incentive to tell the truth.
Another motivation of the appellate court was its disbelief that
employment discrimination was either pervasive or subtle." Given this
impression, a court will give the employer the benefit of every doubt. It is as
if the appellate court determined that employment discrimination has been so
thoroughly obliterated that a trier of fact must assume that no adverse
employment action taken against a person in a protected class could ever be

157. Illinois J. Livingston v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 704 N.E.2d797,804,805,
808 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998); Christ Hosp. & Med. Center v. Human Rights Comm'n, 687
N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (I1.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997). In Illinois this standard is very deferential. A
finding cannot be overturned unless it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence and the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Christ Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 687 N.E.2d at 1092. A

reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence, reassess witness credibility, or substitute its
judgment. Id.
158. Christ Hosp. &Med. Ctr., 687 N.E.2d at 1093. When the issue involves aquestion
of statutory interpretation, an agency's interpretation will be granted substantial deference, since
itisan informed source for interpreting the act itenforces. Bonaguro v.County Officers Electoral
Bd., 634 N.E.2d712, 715 (Ill. 1994); Abrahamson v.minoisDep'tof Prof. Reg., 606 N.E.2d 1111,
1121 (1992).
159. Of course, this maneuver had also been legitimi.zed by the federal courts which were
pretext only jurisdictions.
160. Illinois J.Livingston, 704 N.E.2d at 808.
161. At the oral argument in the Illinois J. Livingston Co. case, one of the justices
commented that complainants won discrimination cases frequently and that there was often direct
evidence of discrimination.
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motivated by discrimination unless there is compelling evidence to the
contrary.
These two motivations demonstrate why the pretext plus position is so
attractive to reviewing courts. However, the pretext sufficient rule, which the
appellate court rejected, better fits the St. Mary's Honor Center decision and
the Supreme Court's earlier case law. It also comports with Illinois case law
under the Human Rights Act. The pretext sufficient rule strikes a balance
between the complainant's burden to prove his case and the employer's
monopoly over the truth. It also strikes a balance between the complainant's

burden and the pervasive and subtle nature of discrimination in our society.
It is the better rule.
VI. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION INREEVES V.
SANDERSON PLUMBING REJECTED THE PRETEXT PLUS APPROACH

Faced with the persistent split that remained after the decision in St.
Mary's Honor Center, the U.S. Supreme Court issued another decision on the
subject last year. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 2 a
unanimous Court rejected the pretext plus view." 3
The plaintiff in Reeves was a fifty-seven year old man who supervised
factory workers for a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers.'" Reeves was
He was
terminated after an investigation into timekeeping practices."
replaced by someone substantially younger.'" Several months before Reeves'
discharge, his supervisor said that he "was so old that he 'must have come over
on the Mayflower,"' and that he was "'too damn old to do the job.""'7
During the trial, the district court denied motions by the employer for a
directed verdict, and instead submitted the case to the jury, instructing that
"[i]f the plaintiff fails to prove age was a determinative or motivating factor
in the decision to terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the
defendant.""' The jury returned a verdict in favor of Reeves, awarding him
damages, and finding that the discrimination against him was willful." 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves
had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow the jury to infer that

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
Id.at 148.
1&at 137.
Id. at 137-38.
Reeves was replaced successively by three people in their thirties. I&dat 142.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000).
Id at 138 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id
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discrimination was the reason for the discharge.' ° The court of appeals
ignored the evidence that made up the prima facie case, relying solely on the
age-related comments to show discrimination.' 7' It then determined that no
inference could be drawn to suggest that those comments were tied to Reeves'
termination. The court further held that the only inferences that could be drawn
from the remaining evidence was that Reeves was treated like every other
employee under investigation and that there was no widespread age-based
animus in the employer's practices." Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed.'"

The Supreme Court took the case to resolve the split remaining after its
7 4 The Court framed the issue as
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center."
"whether a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination... combined with
sufficient evidence for a reasonable factf'mder to reject the employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding
of liability for intentional discrimination."'"1 The Court unanimously held that
it was."

The Supreme Court found that one of the ways that a plaintiff may show
intentional discrimination was to show that the employer's explanation is
unworthy of credence. 1" Additionally, the Court emphasized that even though
the presumption of discrimination drops out of the picture once the employer
meets its burden of production, the fact finder may still consider the evidence
establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and any inferences properly drawn
from that evidence. '7 Moreover, a fact finder is entitled in most circumstances
to infer a discriminatory motive from the fact that the employer lied.' The
Court noted that this inference was consistent with the principle of evidence
that the fact finder may consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as
"'affirmative evidence of guilt.""" ° The Court recognized that the employer
is in the best position to explain the real reason for its action, supporting that
notion with the language of Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,'8 ' stating
that when the legitimate reasons for the employer's action are eliminated, it is
170.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Id at 693-94.
Id. at 694.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 139-40 (2000).
Id
Id at 147-48.
Id. at 142 (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,450 U.S. 248,256(1981)).
Id (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10).
Id at 146.
Id (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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Id at693.
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has some reason, has based its
more likely that an employer, who we assume
82
decision on an impermissible consideration.
The Court left open the possibility that in a few"s cases in which a
plaintiff proves that the employer's proffered reason is a lie, no rational fact
finder will be able to find that discrimination was the real reason.'" For
example, the evidence may conclusively show that some other
nondiscriminatory reason, such as the plaintiffs loyalty to a sports team, was

the real reason for the employer's action.185 Alternatively, the proof that the
employer was lying might be very weak, while abundant and uncontroverted
evidence showed no discrimination. 86
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Reeves clearly rejected the pretext plus approach
and has the potential to restore the balance in employment discrimination cases
in every forum. The Court has made clear that deference must be given to the
fact finder, who, in turn, has been cautioned, nonetheless, that it must consider
the proof making up the prima facie case and the fact that the employer lied in
making its decision. Plaintiffs still bear the ultimate burden of persuasion, but
they may persuade through circumstantial evidence.
If the courts follow Reeves, which they should,' 7 cases like Christ
Hospital and Illinois J. Livingston will not occur again. Once an employee has
won a discrimination case on the merits, that employee should prevail on
appeal as long as there is some evidence to support the elements of the prima
facie case, and there is some evidence to show that the employer is lying about
the reason for the adverse employment action. I hope that Illinois courts and
others take Justice Ginsburg's concurrence to heart and recognize that it will
be an extremely rare case in which a plaintiff proves the employer is lying but
no rational fact finder could find discrimination. However, given the reticence

182.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000).

184.
185.

ld. at 148.
Id

183. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence emphasized that these cases will be very rare. Id. at
153 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
186. This statement is particularly cryptic in this case. The court of appeals found that
Reeves' evidence that the employer lied was very weak. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.
Inc., 197 F.3d 688 692-93 (5th Cir. 1999). However, the Supreme Court found that evidence
adequate. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 144 (2000).
187. Federal courts will have to follow the Supreme Court, but states like Illinois need not
follow it when interpreting their own antidiscrimination statutes. Illinois should follow Reeves,
however, to be consistent.
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by lower courts to follow the Supreme Court's holding in St. Mary's Honor
Center, there will likely be more developments in this area.

